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CAPSIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION: CAN
WASHINGTON STATE FERRIES MEET FEDERAL
SCREENING REQUIREMENTS AND STILL PASS
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL MUSTER?
David J. Perkins
Abstract: In response to the threat of international terrorism, the United States Coast
Guard has issued new regulations requiring every ferry operator to begin screening
passengers and vehicles for dangerous items. These new regulations will force Washington
State Ferries (WSF), the agency responsible for operating the State's ferry system, to either
begin screening passengers and vehicles or face a possible shutdown. Compliance, however,
poses problems for WSF because of privacy protections under the Washington State
Constitution. Article I, section 7 of the state constitution contains an explicit protection of
privacy. This section provides broader protections from warrantless searches by state actors
than similar protections found in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Apparently recognizing that article I, section 7 would not permit physical searches of vehicle
interiors and trunks, WSF has proposed an alternative screening plan that would rely on non-
intrusive technology or dogs to screen vehicles. This Comment argues that the use of these
alternative screening methods will also be an unconstitutional, warrantless search under
article I, section 7. Such searches will not satisfy any of the exceptions to this provision's
warrant requirement, and will make the searches unconstitutional intrusions into the private
affairs of the ferry passengers. Despite its best efforts to find a compromise, WSF may still
be faced with the choice between non-compliance with the federal regulations and violating
its passengers' constitutionally protected privacy rights.
Washington State Ferries (WSF) operates the largest ferry system in
the United States.t WSF describes itself as a "maritime highway" that
carries 20,000 passengers each day.2 The ferry system consists of
twenty-nine vessels and twenty ferry terminals. 3 Additionally, WSF is
the only practical means of transportation-and the sole means of
commercial transport-between the mainland and populations living on
Vashon Island and the San Juan Islands.4
WSF now faces a dilemma. New maritime security regulations 5
issued by the U.S. Coast Guard as part of the nation's "multi-front war
1. WASH. STATE FERRIES, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LARGEST FERRY SYSTEM IN THE NATION 2
(2003).
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id. at 2.
5. National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. §§ 101-104 (2003).
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against global terrorism '' 6 require WSF to begin screening passengers
and vehicles for dangerous items by June 30, 2004.7 All commercial
ferry operators must develop a security plan that includes "a reasonable
examination" of passengers and vehicles to ensure that no "dangerous
substances and devices" are present. 8 Any operator that fails to comply
by the June 30, 2004 deadline faces the possible shutdown of its ferry
operations. 9
Complying with these requirements, however, presents significant
legal problems for WSF. Absent a warrant or an exception to the warrant
requirement,10 opening and inspecting vehicle interiors and trunks would
violate article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution.l" Article
I, section 7's explicit protection of privacy is broader than the similar
protections of the Fourth Amendment 12 of the U.S. Constitution. 3 Under
article I, section 7, warrantless searches are unconstitutional absent
special circumstances. 14
Noting the protections of the state constitution, WSF has proposed an
alternative, less intrusive screening plan to meet federal security
requirements. 15 Instead of opening vehicle interiors for inspection, this
plan relies on the use of non-intrusive technology or dogs to screen
vehicles. 16 However, despite the less intrusive nature of this alternative
plan, these methods will result in the same constitutional problems as
opening and inspecting each vehicle compartment.
This Comment argues that WSF's proposed screening plan violates
article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution. As WSF may
have recognized, physical inspections of vehicle trunks and interiors
would constitute searches under the state constitution, triggering the
protections of article I, section 7. However, WSF's proposed use of non-
intrusive technology or dogs will similarly constitute a search under
6. U.S. COAST GUARD, MARITIME STRATEGY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY, at i (2002).
7. 33 C.F.R. § 104.115.
8. Id. § 101.105.
9. See 46 U.S.C. § 70103(c)(5) (Partial Revision 2003).
10. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
11. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.").
13. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986).
14. Id.
15. See WASH. STATE FERRIES, ALTERNATIVE SECURITY PROGRAM (2003).
16. Id. at 3.
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Washington law. These searches will not satisfy any of the "jealously
and carefully drawn" exceptions 7 to the state constitution's warrant
requirement under article I, section 7. Despite WSF's efforts to find a
constitutionally acceptable method of screening vehicles, its current
proposal will not satisfy either the requirements of the new federal
maritime regulations or the protections of the state constitution.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the privacy
protections of article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution,
as well as the specific protections afforded to automobiles. Part II
discusses the factors used by the Supreme Court of Washington to
determine whether the use of technology or dogs is a search under
article I, section 7. Part III describes the new federal maritime
regulations and WSF's proposal to comply with these regulations.
Finally, Part IV argues that WSF's use of non-intrusive technology or
dogs to screen vehicles will constitute a search and will trigger the
protections of article I, section 7. Part IV further argues that these
searches will not satisfy any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement
and will be an unconstitutional intrusion into the passengers' private
affairs. Part V concludes that a constitutional challenge to WSF's plan
under article I, section 7 will likely succeed, unless the court creates a
new exception to the warrant requirement for minimally intrusive
searches where the threat from terrorists is severe.
I. CITIZENS HAVE A PRESUMPTIVE RIGHT TO BE FREE OF
WARRANTLESS SEARCHES UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution explicitly
provides for a right to privacy that protects individuals from warrantless
searches of their persons, homes, and vehicles. The provision states: "No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded,
without authority of law."' 8 The Supreme Court of Washington has
interpreted this section to create a body of jurisprudence independent
from the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.' 9 The protections
of article I, section 7 are broader than those of the Fourth Amendment; 20
the state protections prohibit warrantless searches unless justified by one
17. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
18. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
19. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 61-62, 720 P.2d 808, 812-13 (1986).
20. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 70 n.1, 917 P.2d at 567 n.1.
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of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement 21 and include ahistorically recognized expectation of privacy in motor vehicles.22
A. Article I, Section 7 Provides a Broader Right to Privacy Than the
Similar Protections Afforded by the Fourth Amendment
The Supreme Court of Washington has interpreted the text and history
of the Washington State Constitution's article I, section 7 as affording a
broader right to privacy than that protected by the Fourth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution.23 In State v. Gunwall,24 the Supreme Court of
Washington adopted six nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in
determining whether a provision of the state constitution affords more
protections than its federal counterpart.25 Applying those factors to
article I, section 7, the court held that in certain circumstances this
section provides broader protections than the Fourth Amendment.26 The
court concluded that the framers of the state constitution intended to
provide an explicit protection of privacy, not merely protection from
unlawful searches and seizures, as evidenced by the significant textual
differences between the state and federal provisions and the legislative
history of article I, section 7.27
In the years immediately following the Gunwall decision, Washington
courts would not address article I, section 7 contentions unless the
parties adequately briefed the Gunwall factors. 28 This adequate briefing
requirement led to a number of cases in which Washington courts only
addressed rights under the Fourth Amendment. 29 Despite this initially
inconsistent application, the court now considers it a matter of well-
21. Id. at 70, 917 P.2d at 568.
22. Id. at 70 n.l, 917 P.2d at 567 n.l.
23. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
24. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
25. These six factors are: (1) the textual language of the Washington State Constitution; (2)
significant differences in the texts of parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3)
state constitutional and common law history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) differences in the
structure between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) matters of particular state interest or
local concern. Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
26. See id. at 63-67, 720 P.2d at 814-15; see also infra Part L.D (providing examples of situations
where article 1, section 7 provides broader protections than the Fourth Amendment).
27. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
28. See State v. Cantrell, 124 Wash. 2d 183, 190 n.19, 875 P.2d 1208, 1212 n.19 (1994).
29. See, -e.g., State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash. 2d 373, 385 n.33, 5 P.3d 668, 675 n.33 (2000) (refusing
to address article I, section 7 claims because parties did not adequately brief Gunwall factors); State
v. Maxfield, 125 Wash. 2d 378, 394-95, 886 P.2d 123, 132 (1994) (same).
Vol. 79:725, 2004
Capsized by the Constitution
settled law that article I, section 7 provides broader protections than the
Fourth Amendment.3°
B. Warrantless Searches Performed by State Actors Are Per Se
Unreasonable and Violate Article I, Section 7
An alleged violation of article I, section 7 must satisfy two
requirements. First a "search" must occur.3 1 The Supreme Court of
Washington has defined a search as an "intru[sion] into a person's
'private affairs."'' 32 Under article I, section 7, the court defines the
boundaries of "private affairs" by a traditional, objective standard, not
the individual's subjective perception of the intrusion.33 Specifically, the
right to privacy includes "those privacy interests which citizens of this
state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental
trespass absent a warrant. This definition contrasts with the Fourth
Amendment standard, which recognizes searches only in situations
where individuals have both a reasonable and subjective expectation of
privacy.35
Second, the search must be performed by a state actor.36 Normally,
for the purposes of article I, section 7, a state actor is a law-enforcement
officer.37 However, other state employees acting in their official
capacities can also be deemed state actors.38 For example, Washington
courts have held that the actions of a tax appraiser,39 a city building
inspector,40 a public utility district's treasurer-comptroller, 4' and school
30. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70 n., 917 P.2d 563, 567 n.1 (1996).
31. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593, 597 (1994).
32. State v. Boland, 115 Wash. 2d 571, 577, 800 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1990) (quoting State v.
Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984)).
33. See Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 181, 867 P.2d at 597.
34. Id. (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151, 154 (1984)) (internal
quotations omitted).
35. See id. (noting differences between private affairs inquiry under article I, section 7 and the
reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment).
36. In re Maxfield, 133 Wash. 2d 332, 337, 945 P.2d 196, 198 (1997).
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. See State v. Vonhof, 51 Wash. App. 33, 37, 751 P.2d 1221, 1224 (1988).
40. See City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash. 2d 260, 271, 868 P.2d 134, 139-40 (1994).
41. See Maxfield, 133 Wash. 2d at 337, 945 P.2d at 199.
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officials 42 are searches by state actors that trigger the protections of
article I, section 7.43
Absent one of the six recognized exceptions, 44 warrantless searches
performed by state actors are "per se unreasonable" under article I,
section 7.45 The Supreme Court of Washington first applied the per se
unreasonable rule to warrantless searches approximately thirty years
ago.46 Under this rule, warrantless searches are presumed to be
impermissible, and the prosecution bears the burden of showing that
these searches fall within an exception to the warrant requirement.47
C. Washington Courts Permit Warrantless Searches Under Six
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court of Washington recognizes six "jealously and
carefully drawn" exceptions to the general rule that warrantless searches
are per se unreasonable under article I, section 7.48 These six exceptions
are: (1) searches incident to a valid arrest; (2) inventory searches; (3)
plain view; (4) investigative stops; (5) consent; and (6) exigent
circumstances. 49 Under article I, section 7, the court does not recognize
an exception for circumstances where a threat to public safety may
outweigh individual privacy rights. °
Washington case law has further defined and limited these exceptions
to the warrant requirement. A search incident to arrest only applies
during the arrest process and is generally limited to searches for
weapons or destructible evidence. 51 Inventory searches are limited to
42. See Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash. 2d 594, 602, 694 P.2d 1078, 1083
(1985).
43. Maxfield, 133 Wash. 2d at 337, 945 P.2d at 199.
44. See infra Part I.C.
45. State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
46. Id. at 70-71, 917 P.2d at 568.
47. Id. at 70, 917 P.2d at 568.
48. Id. Interpreting the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of Washington has applied a
"community caretaking" exception to allow evidence obtained by police encounters involving
emergency aid and routine checks on health and safety where these encounters were completely
divorced from any criminal investigation. However, the court did not address if these actions
violated article I, section 7 because the parties had not properly briefed the Gunwall factors. State v.
Kinzy, 141 Wash. 2d 373, 385 n.33, 5 P.3d 668, 675 n.33 (2000). The court has not recognized the
community caretaking exception in the article I, section 7 jurisprudence.
49. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
50. See infra Part I.C.3.
51. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151-52, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (1986).
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instances where officers need to precisely catalog property taken into
custody to defend against claims of theft and vandalism. 52 The plain
view exception only allows for a warrantless visual search where
officers "(1) have a prior justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertently
discover the incriminating evidence; and (3) immediately recognize the
item as contraband. 5 3 The investigative stop is an exception that allows
law-enforcement officers to briefly detain persons for questioning if the
officers reasonably suspect these persons of criminal activity.54 The
remaining two exceptions, consent and exigent circumstances, require a
more detailed explanation.
1. Consent Must Be Given Voluntarily To Satisfy the Consent
Exception
Coerced or involuntary consent does not satisfy the consent exception
to the warrant requirement.55 Washington courts have struck down
consent searches where the method employed to obtain consent was
coercive.56 For example, in State v. Ferrier,57 the Supreme Court of
Washington struck down "knock and talk" procedures in which heavily
armed law-enforcement officers entered a suspect's home and asked for
consent to search.58 The court held that this "show of force" was
"inherently coercive," and any subsequently obtained consent was
invalid.59
Additionally, the Supreme Court of Washington has determined that
requiring patrons to consent to searches as a condition of admission to a
public event constitutes impermissible coercion. 60 In Jacobsen v. City of
Seattle,6' the court found coercion where admission to a rock concert
was conditioned on consent to pat down searches.62 The court rejected
52. See State v. Dugas, 109 Wash. App. 592, 597, 36 P.3d 577, 580 (2001).
53. State v. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332, 346, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (1991).
54. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
55. State v. Hastings, 119 Wash. 2d 229, 234, 830 P.2d 658, 661 (1992); see State v. Ferrier, 136
Wash. 2d 103, 115, 960 P.2d 927, 933 (1998).
56. See Ferrier, 136 Wash. 2d at 115, 960 P.2d at 933.
57. 136 Wash. 2d 103, 960 P.2d 927 (1998).
58. Id. at 118-19, 960 P.2d at 934.
59. Id. at 115, 960 P.2d at 933.
60. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 674, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983).
61. 98 Wash. 2d 668, 658 P.2d 653 (1983).
62. Id. at 670, 658 P.2d at 654-55.
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the notion that these searches were consensual despite video evidence
showing concert goers willfully and good-naturedly complying with the
search requirement.63 Where admission is conditioned on consent, this
consent is coerced and does not satisfy the consent exception to the
warrant requirement. 64
Under article I, section 7, the Supreme Court of Washington has
allowed the notion of implied consent in narrow circumstances.65 In
State v. Curran,66 the court upheld a statute that declared a driver to be
"deemed to have given consent" to a blood alcohol test67 if the driver has
been arrested and the arresting officer has "reasonable grounds to
believe the [driver] had been driving.., under the influence of
intoxicating liquor., 68 The court first determined that taking the arrested
driver's blood and testing it for evidence of intoxication was a search.69
The court then held that the search was constitutional under a theory of
implied consent because there "was a clear indication that [the blood
test] would reveal evidence of [the driver's] intoxication., 70 The court
concluded that this "clear indication" was met by evidence showing that
the driver smelled of alcohol and appeared disoriented with watery,
bloodshot eyes.71 Thus, although the theory of implied consent appears
to broaden the consent exception, the court has only upheld this theory
in situations where a law-enforcement officer had a "clear indication"
that the search of an arrested suspect would uncover evidence of a crime.
2. The Exigent Circumstances Exception Requires Both Probable
Cause and the Impracticality of Obtaining a Warrant
Another exception to the warrant requirement, exigent circumstances,
exists when law-enforcement officers can show both probable cause and
that obtaining a warrant is impractical because of an immediate need to
search for and seize evidence.72 First, the officers must have probable
63. Id. at 674, 658 P.2d at 656-67.
64. See id. at 674, 658 P.2d at 656.
65. See State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 185, 804 P.2d 558, 564 (1991).
66. 116 Wash. 2d 174, 804 P.2d 558 (1991).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.308 (2003).
68. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d at 179, 804 P.2d at 561.
69. Id. at 184, 804 P.2d at 564.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1998 Update, 22
SEATTLE U. L. REv. 337, 503 (1998).
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cause that the items to be seized are connected with criminal activity and
will be found in the place to be searched.73 Probable cause is an
individualized suspicion, or nexus, between the suspects to be searched
and the criminal activity.74 For example, in State v. Counts,75 law-
enforcement officers used a tracking dog to follow a fleeing suspect to
his house.7 6 The Supreme Court of Washington concluded that officers
had sufficient probable cause to search the home based on an
individualized suspicion that they would find the suspect within.
77
Second, the officers must show that special circumstances made it
impractical for them to obtain a warrant.78 The court has found "special
circumstances" in situations such as the pursuit of a fleeing suspect 79 or
where evidence may be destroyed.80 If the state can show both probable
cause and the impracticality of obtaining a warrant, then a warrantless
search is permissible under the exigent circumstances exception.81
3. Under Article I, Section 7, Washington Courts Do Not Recognize
an Exception for Situations Where Strong Public Safety Interests
May Outweigh Individual Privacy Rights
Under article I, section 7, the Supreme Court of Washington does not
recognize an exception to the warrant requirement for situations in
which the need to curb a threat to public safety can justify warrantless
searches. Federal courts have upheld searches at airports82  and
73. Id. at 377.
74. See State v. Carter, 79 Wash. App. 154, 158, 901 P.2d 335, 339 (1995).
75. 99 Wash. 2d 54, 659 P.2d 1087 (1983).
76. Id. at 59, 659 P.2d at 1089.
77. See id. at 59-60, 659 P.2d at 1089-90 (recognizing that the officers had sufficient probable
cause to obtain a warrant, but invalidating the warrantless search because the officers were not in
"hot pursuit").
78. Johnson, supra note 72, at 503.
79. See Counts, 99 Wash. 2d at 60, 659 P.2d at 1090 (recognizing that hot pursuit could create
exigent circumstances, but holding that hot pursuit did not exist when suspect fled into home under
the observation of law-enforcement officers).
80. See State v. Carter, 127 Wash. 2d 836, 839-40, 904 P.2d 290, 292 (1995) (holding that
exigent circumstances justified search of motel room where an undercover law-enforcement officer
bought drugs from a dealer operating out of the room).
81. Johnson, supra note 72, at 503.
82. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that searches at
airports did not violate the Fourth Amendment where the danger to the public was severe and the
metal detector searches used were minimally intrusive).
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courthouses83 under the Fourth Amendment by balancing public
security, the efficacy of the search, and the degree of intrusion
involved.84 Prior to Gunwall, in the infancy of independent article I,
section 7 jurisprudence, the Supreme Court of Washington included
"airport and courthouse searches" within its list of exceptions to the
warrant requirement but never applied this exception to a specific case.85
Following Gunwall, however, the court has made consistent reference to
only the six exceptions described above when deciding a case under
article I, section 7.86
D. Washington Courts Recognize a Legitimate Expectation of Privacy
in Motor Vehicles and Refuse To Permit Warrantless Searches
Absent an Exception to the Warrant Requirement
There is a long-standing history in Washington of recognizing the
privacy interests of individuals in their automobiles.87 As the Supreme
Court of Washington said in City of Seattle v. Mesiani,88 "[f]rom the
earliest days of the automobile in this state, this court has acknowledged
the privacy interest of individuals and objects in automobiles., 89 More
explicitly, the court declared in State v. Stroud90 that "a person in
possession of a vehicle has a legitimate expectation of privacy under
article I, section 7 in the vehicle ... [and] articles within the vehicle
which.., are not visible." 9' Accordingly, under Washington law,
warrantless searches of motor vehicles, like searches of persons or
homes, are per se unreasonable under article I, section 7.92 The Supreme
Court of Washington has struck down several types of warrantless motor
83. See Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972) (holding that searches at
courthouses did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
84. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 673, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983) (discussing
the federal jurisprudence concerning searches at courthouses and airports).
85. See id. at 672, 658 P.2d at 655.
86. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 71, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996); see also City of
Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456-58, 755 P.2d 775, 776-77 (1988) (refusing to create an
exception for a situation where sobriety checkpoints were used to curb the public safety danger
posed by drunk driving).
87. See Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 457, 755 P.2d at 777.
88. 110 Wash. 2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988).
89. Id. at 456-57, 755 P.2d at 777.
90. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986).
91. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
92. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 70, 917 P.2d 563, 568 (1996).
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vehicle searches under article I, section 7, including the warrantless
search of locked vehicle compartments after the arrest of the owner in
Stroud93 and the use of sobriety checkpoints in Mesiani.
94
These rulings starkly contrast with U.S. Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence involving searches and seizures of motor
vehicles. Under the Fourth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court allows
law-enforcement officers to search the passenger compartment of a
vehicle, and any locked compartments within, after the arrest of the
driver. 95 Taking a more restrictive stance, the Stroud court held that
exigent circumstances, such as the possibility that evidence could be
destroyed or the vehicle could be driven away, justified a search incident
to arrest of the passenger compartment, but did not justify a search of
locked vehicle compartments under article I, section 7.96 The court noted
that locking a vehicle compartment produced "additional privacy
expectations" that were "objectively justifiable. 97
Similarly, while the Supreme Court of Washington prohibits sobriety
checkpoints under article I, section 7, these checkpoints are permissible
under the Fourth Amendment.98 The U.S. Supreme Court allowed
sobriety checkpoints under the Fourth Amendment, reasoning that the
public safety benefits of curbing drunk driving outweighed the "slight"
intrusion into the rights of law-abiding motorists.99 In contrast, the
Supreme Court of Washington struck down sobriety checkpoints under
article I, section 7 in Mesiani.00 Despite evidence that cataloged the
"slaughter on our highways,"'' 01 the Mesiani court refused to justify these
intrusions based on "an inference from statistics that there are inebriated
drivers in the area."'' 0 2 Instead of adopting a balancing test that weighed
the public safety benefit against the intrusion into private affairs, the
93. See Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
94. See Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-58, 755 P.2d at 776-77.
95. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981).
96. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
97. Id.
98. See Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-58,755 P.2d at 776-77.
99. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
100. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-58, 755 P.2d at 776-77.
101. Fury v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 110, 117, 730 P.2d 62, 66 (1986), rev'd sub noma.
Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-58, 755 P.2d at 776-77.
102. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458 n.1,755 P.2d at 777 n.l.
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court limited its inquiry to the traditional exceptions to the warrant
requirement. 103
Although one Washington State Court of Appeals decision did uphold
the warrantless search of all vehicles on a ferry, the court based the
holding on the Fourth Amendment, not article I, section 7, and limited it
to specific factual circumstances. 104 In State v. Silvernail,10 5 Division I of
the Washington State Court of Appeals upheld the search of all vehicles
on a ferry. °6 As two suspects fled the scene of an armed robbery on
Vashon Island, a victim overheard a portion of the suspects'
conversation and inferred that they were heading for the Seattle ferry.
107
When the ferry arrived in Seattle, police officers began to search each
vehicle on the ferry and discovered weapons and "suspected narcotics"
in Silvernail's vehicle. 10 8 Relying on Fourth Amendment precedent, the
Washington State Court of Appeals upheld the search.109 Although the
Supreme Court of Washington did not review the case, the high court
has subsequently noted the limited scope of the Silvernail opinion. The
court declined to extend the Silvernail reasoning in Mesiani and
commented that the Silvernail decision was "expressly limited to
situations in which there was reliable information that a serious felony
had recently been committed."" 0
In sum, article I, section 7 provides broader protections from
warrantless searches of persons and vehicles than the Fourth
Amendment. The article I, section 7 protections include a general
prohibition on warrantless searches that is limited by six judicially
recognized exceptions. Consent can serve as an exception to the warrant
requirement if it is voluntary. Similarly, exigent circumstances can
qualify as an exception if the law-enforcement officer performing the
search can show that sufficient probable cause existed and that obtaining
a warrant was impractical. Washington courts do not recognize an
103. See id. at 456-57, 755 P.2d at 776-77.
104. Id. at 458 n.1, 755 P.2d at 777 n.I.
105. 25 Wash. App. 185, 605 P.2d 1279 (1980).
106. Id. at 191, 605 P.2d at 1283.
107. Id. at 186-88, 605 P.2d at 1281.
108. Id. Silvernail was not one of the two armed robbery suspects. He had the misfortune of being
on the wrong ferry at the wrong time.
109. Id. at 190-91, 605 P.2d at 1282-83 (noting the danger or unrestrained roadblock searches,
but holding that the search was permissible because of the minimal intrusion of the search and its
"reasonable likelihood of success").
110. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775, 777 n.l (1988).
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exception to the warrant requirement where the public safety benefit
outweighs an intrusion into private affairs. Finally, the broader
protections of article I, section 7 include a historic recognition of an
individual's legitimate expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle.
II. UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, THE USE OF
TECHNOLOGICAL DEVICES OR DOGS MAY BE A SEARCH
Washington courts limit the ability of law-enforcement officers to use
technology or dogs to intrude into private affairs. Noting that technology
"races ahead with ever increasing speed," eroding expectations of
privacy "without our awareness, much less our consent," Washington
courts continue to protect traditional privacy rights under article I,
section 7.111 In certain situations, the courts classify the use of
technology or dogs as a search subject to the warrant requirement of
article I, section 7.112 This classification depends on the vantage point,
the level of intrusiveness, and the constitutional protections involved in
the use.' 1
3
A. The Use of Infrared Devices To Detect Activity Within a Home
Constitutes a Search
The Supreme Court of Washington has declared that the use of
infrared detection devices to observe activities within a home constitutes
a search under article I, section 7, and must therefore satisfy one of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 14 In State v. Young," 5 law-
enforcement officers used infrared thermal detection devices to detect
excessive heat emanating from a residence suspected of containing a
marijuana growing operation. 6 To determine whether the use of this
technology constituted a search under article I, section 7, the court
considered three factors: the lawfulness of the vantage point, the
intrusiveness of the means used, and the nature of the property
111. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 184, 867 P.2d 593, 598 (1994).
112. See id. at 188, 867 P.2d at 600; State v. Dearman, 92 Wash. App. 630, 635-36, 962 P.2d
850, 853-54 (1998).
113. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 182-84, 867 P.2d at 597-98.
114. See id. at 184, 867 P.2d at 598-99.
115. 123 Wash. 2d 173, 867 P.2d 593 (1994).
116. Id. at 177-78, 867 P.2d at 595.
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targeted."17 Although the law-enforcement officer in Young was
observing from a lawful vantage point, the court noted that the
intrusiveness of the infrared detector allowed officers to "see through the
walls" and that the target of the observation was a home." 8 Based on
these three factors, the court ruled that the use of technology was an
intrusion into both a home and private affairs and was therefore a search
under article I, section 7.19 Because the officers had not obtained a
warrant or satisfied an exception to the warrant requirement, the court
invalidated this procedure as an unreasonable search. 20
B. A Dog Sniff May Be a Search if It Intrudes into a Constitutionally
Protected Place
Under Washington law, a dog sniff may constitute a search depending
on the object sniffed and circumstances surrounding the sniff.'12 State
appellate court decisions have held that a dog sniff does not constitute a
search under article 1, section 7 if the defendant has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the object being sniffed and the dog sniff is
minimally intrusive. 122 In State v. Boyce, 123 the court ruled that a dog
sniff around the defendant's safety deposit box was not a search under
article I, section 7.124 The Boyce court reasoned that the defendant had
no expectation of privacy in the bank vault and that it was only
minimally intrusive for an officer invited into the bank to use the dog in
this manner.125 The court followed nearly identical reasoning in State v.
Stanphill,126 and ruled that a dog sniff of a package at a post office was
also not a search. 127 In State v. Wolohan,128 the court held that a dog sniff
of a package at a bus terminal was not a search 129 but expressed "grave
117. Id. at 182-84, 867 P.2d at 597-99.
118. Id. at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
119. Id. at 184, 867 P.2d at 599.
120. Id.
121. See State v. Dearman, 92 Wash. App. 630, 635-37, 962 P.2d 850, 853-54 (1998).
122. See id.
123. 44 Wash. App. 724, 723 P.2d 28 (1986).
124. Id. at 730, 723 P.2d at 31.
125. Id.
126. 53 Wash. App. 623, 769 P.2d 861 (1989).
127. Id. at 630-31, 769 P.2d at 865.
128. 23 Wash. App. 813, 598 P.2d 421 (1979).
129. Id. at 820, 598 P.2d at 425.
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doubts" about extending this ruling to a dog sniff of personal effects on
or near a person. 130 This situational approach contrasts with the U.S.
Supreme Court's blanket ruling that dog sniffs never constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.'13
Although the Supreme Court of Washington has not ruled on these
appellate court dog sniff rulings, 32 it has stated that a dog sniff might
constitute a search under article I, section 7 in some situations.133 The
court made this statement in Young as part of its discussion of the use of
infrared detectors. 34 Without elaborating, the court said that dog sniffs
targeted at an object or location that is "subject to heightened
constitutional protection" might be searches under article I, section 7.35
The Washington State Court of Appeals subsequently applied the
Young factors to determine whether a dog sniff outside of a garage was a
search under article I, section 7.136 Relying on the dicta in Young
concerning dog searches, 37 the court looked at the lawfulness of the
vantage point, the intrusiveness of the means used, and the nature of the
property targeted to determine whether a dog sniff was a search. 38 The
court stated that the vantage point of the sniff was lawful, but the dog
sniff was intrusive because it allowed officers to "see through the
walls.', 139 Furthermore, the target of the sniff, a garage attached to a
home, was subject to higher constitutional protections. 14  The court
concluded that the dog sniff of the garage was a search and was
unreasonable because the officers had not obtained a warrant or satisfied
any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.'
4
'
130. Id. at 820 n.5, 598 P.2d at 425 n.5. The court applied the Fourth Amendment because the
search took place in Arizona. Id. at 814, 598 P.2d at 422.
131. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a dog sniff of luggage is not a
search because it does not require the opening of the luggage, does not expose non-contraband items
to public view, and only discloses the presence or absence of contraband, and therefore is limited in
both the manner of intrusion and the content of the information revealed).
132. Neither Boyce, Stanphill, nor Wolohan were appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.
133. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 188, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (1994).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. State v. Dearman, 92 Wash. App. 630, 634-37, 962 P.2d 850, 853-54 (1998).
137. See Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 187-88, 867 P.2d at 600-01.
138. Dearman, 92 Wash. App. at 635-37, 962 P.2d at 853-54.
139. Id. at 635, 962 P.2d at 853-54.
140. Id.
141. See id. at 635-37, 962 P.2d at 853-54.
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In sum, under Washington law, the privacy protections of article I,
section 7 limit the use of technology and dogs to intrude into private
affairs. Determining whether the use of a technological device by law-
enforcement officers is a search depends on the lawfulness of the
vantage point, the intrusiveness of the means used, and the nature of the
property targeted. Applying similar factors, the use of dogs may also
constitute a search under article I, section 7.
III. WSF PLANS TO USE NON-INTRUSIVE TECHNOLOGY AND
DOGS TO SCREEN VEHICLES
WSF is proposing an alternative security program, using non-
intrusive technology or dogs, 142 to meet the new security requirements
outlined in the National Maritime Security Initiative (NMSI). 143 The
NMSI regulations require all ferry operators to search a variable
percentage of passengers and vehicles prior to boarding. 144 Perhaps
recognizing that the privacy protections of article I, section 7 of the
Washington State Constitution would prevent state agents from
conducting searches of passengers and vehicles, WSF has submitted an
alternative security plan. 145
A. The NMSI Regulations Require All Ferry Operators To Search a
Percentage of Passengers and Their Motor Vehicles and To Deny
Passage to Passengers Who Refuse To Consent to These Searches
Pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause, 146 Congress
enacted the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA) 147 to
142. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 15, at 1.
143. National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. §§ 101-104 (2003).
144. Id. § 104.265.
145. Ray Rivera, No Random Searches in Ferry-Security Plan, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2003,
at B 1.
146. Since Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized the authority of Congress to regulate navigable waterways and ports derived from the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. If federal and
state regulations of maritime activities conflict, the Court asks whether Congress has left the states
any room to impose regulations of their own, not whether Congress has the authority to regulate in
this area. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000). Congress cannot compel states to
enforce or implement federal programs. See Prinz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997)
(holding that Congress could not require local law-enforcement officers to conduct background
checks as part of a federal program regulating the interstate sale of firearms even though Congress
had the authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate the sales); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that Congress could not compel New York to either regulate low-
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safeguard the nation's ports and waterways. 148 International terrorists
have already demonstrated their inclination to use the nation's maritime
transportation system to further their attacks. 149 Ahmed Ressam, an
Algerian national, was arrested for smuggling bomb making materials
from Victoria, British Columbia, to Port Angeles, Washington, aboard a
WSF ferry in the spare tire compartment of his rental car.150 Recognizing
that other terrorists could use the United States' maritime transportation
systems to further their goals, the MTSA aims to protect the nation's
ports from terrorist attacks and to prevent their use by terrorists.'51
To implement the MTSA, the U.S. Coast Guard issued new
regulations in the form of the NMSI. 152 These regulations condition
continued vessel operation on each vessel operator's submission and
implementation of an acceptable Vessel Security Plan. 153 Any vessel
operator failing to comply by June 30, 2004154 must cease operations.
155
An acceptable security plan must provide for the "reasonable
examination" of a randomly selected percentage of passengers and
level radioactive waste in accordance with federal guidelines or take title to the waste). However,
Congress does have the authority to directly regulate the states under the Commerce Clause. See
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985) (holding that the Fair
Labor Standards Act applied to states as well as private employers and that there was no state
immunity from regulation under the Commerce Clause).
Additionally, federal courts have not exempted states from compliance with federal legislation
when the states cannot comply with legislation due to limitations imposed by state constitutions. See
North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532, 535-36 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (holding that
North Carolina was not exempt from a federal provision requiring states to create a "certificate of
need mechanism" in order to receive federal funding for health care, even though the North
Carolina constitution prohibited the creation of such a mechanism), affd, 435 U.S. 962 (1978). The
Califano court reasoned that "[slimply because one State, by some oddity of its Constitution may be
prohibited from compliance [with a federal statute] is not sufficient ground, though, to invalidate a
condition which is legitimately related to a national interest." Id. at 535. The court worried that a
state could "thwart the congressional purpose by the expedient of amending its Constitution." Id.
147. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70102-70103 (Partial Revision 2003).
148. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PROTECTING AMERICA'S PORTS 3 (2003).
149. Id.
150. Steve Miletich et al., FBI Probes Possible Terrorist Plot Here: Man with Bomb Materials
Was Seattle Bound, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 17, 1999, at Al.
151. U.S. DEP'TOF HOMELAND SEC.,supra note 148, at 3.
152. Id.
153. National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. § 104.115 (2003).
154. Id. § 104.115(b).
155. 46 U.S.C. § 70103(c)(5) (Partial Revision 2003).
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vehicles for "dangerous substances and devices." 156 This percentage will
increase as the Marine Security level increases. 157 At the highest security
level, operators must screen all passengers and vehicles1 58 even though
the U.S. Coast Guard may not be able to identify a certain vessel as a
specific target. 159 Additionally, all vessel operators must post signs
stating that "[b]oarding the vessel is deemed valid consent to screening
or inspection," and "[flailure to consent or submit to screening or
inspection will result in denial or revocation of authorization to
board."1
60
B. WSF Has Proposed an Alternative Security Program To Satisfy
NMSI Requirements
WSF's proposed alternative security program will vary significantly
from the standard screening procedures outlined in the NMSI. 161 A
provision of the NMSI allows vessel operators to submit alternative
security programs that satisfy the same screening requirements discussed
above but that deviate in their specific screening procedures. 62 WSF
submitted an alternative security plan that will use "non-intrusive
technology" and "explosive detection dogs" to screen vehicles. 63 In a
press release explaining this plan, WSF indicated that opening and
156. 33 C.F.R. § 104.265(e)(1). The NMSI defines "screening" as "a reasonable examination of
persons, cargo, vehicles, or baggage.. . to ensure that dangerous substances and devices, or other
items that pose a real danger of violence or a threat to security are not present." Id. § 101.105.
"Dangerous substances or devices" are defined as "any material, substance, or item that may cause
damage or injury to any person, vessel, facility, harbor, port, or waters" and is "unlawful to possess
under applicable Federal, State or local law." Id.
157. Id. § 104.265. The Marine Security (MARSEC) level is "set to reflect the prevailing threat
environment to the marine elements of the national transportation system." Id. § 101.105.
MARSEC- I, the lowest level of security, is defined as "the level for which minimum appropriate
protective security measures shall be maintained at all times." Id. MARSEC-2 is "the level for
which appropriate additional protective security measures shall be maintained for a period of time
as a result of heightened risk of a transportation security incident." Id. MARSEC-3 is the "level for
which further specific protective security measures shall be maintained for a limited period of time
when a transportation security incident is probable or imminent, although it may not be possible to
identify the specific target." Id.
158. Id. § 104.265(g)(1).
159. Id. § 101.105.
160. Id. § 104.265(e)(2).
161. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 15, at 1-3.
162. 33 C.F.R. § 104.140.
163. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 15, at 3. WSF has not specified what types of "non-
intrusive technology" it will be using. See id.
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inspecting vehicle interiors and trunks might lead to constitutional
challenges. 164 The proposed alternative plan is WSF's attempt to satisfy
both the federal regulatory and state constitutional requirements.
1 65
Assuming that the U.S. Coast Guard approves WSF's alternative plan,
these new security measures will go into effect by June 30, 2004.166
IV. WSF'S PROPOSED PROGRAM WILL BE AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH
Despite WSF's attempt to craft an alternate security plan that
complies with article I, section 7, the use of technology and dogs to
screen vehicles will still violate the privacy rights of ferry passengers.
The use of non-intrusive technology and dogs to ascertain the contents
of vehicles at ferry terminals will constitute a warrantless search under
article I, section 7.167 These searches will not satisfy any of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, and will therefore be
impermissible under article I, section 7.168
A. The Use of Non-Intrusive Technology or Dogs To Screen Vehicles
Will Be a Search Subject to the Warrant Requirement ofArticle I,
Section 7
The opening and inspection of a vehicle's interior and trunk by a state
actor constitutes a warrantless search triggering the protections of
article I, section 7.169 WSF's proposed alternative, the use of technology
or dogs to screen vehicles, will also constitute a search.1 70 Using
technology or dogs, like all other searches by state actors, will be
unreasonable per se and unconstitutional under article I, section 7, absent
a warrant or one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement. 171
164. Rivera, supra note 145, at BI.
165. Id.
166. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 15, at 3.
167. See infra Part IV.A.
168. See infra Part IV.B.
169. See infra Part IV.A. 1.
170. See infra Part IV.A.2-3.
171. See supra Part L.A-C.
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1. The Opening and Inspecting of Vehicle Interiors and Trunks by
State Employees Are Searches Under Article I, Section 7
As WSF may have suspected, 72 the opening and inspection of vehicle
interiors and trunks by WSF employees satisfies both requirements of a
search under article I, section 7.173 First, the Supreme Court of
Washington has held that opening and inspecting the contents of locked
vehicle compartments is an intrusion into the private affairs of the
vehicle owner. 174 Second, the WSF employees performing these
screenings are state employees acting in their official capacities. Like
other state employees, such as a tax appraiser, a city building inspector,
a public utility district's treasurer-comptroller, and school officials,
75
Washington courts will find WSF employees to be state actors as well.
2. The Use of Non-Intrusive Technology To Screen Vehicles Will Also
Constitute a Search Under Article 1, Section 7
WSF's plan to use non-intrusive technology to screen vehicles will
still qualify as a search under article I, section 7. The Supreme Court of
Washington considered three factors in ruling that the use of infrared
detection equipment to search houses for suspected marijuana growing
operations constituted a search under article I, section 7: the lawfulness
of the vantage point, the intrusiveness of the means used, and the nature
of the property targeted. 176 The court concluded that although the
officers were using the device from a lawful vantage point, the action
still constituted a search because the intrusiveness of the device enabled
the officers to "see through the walls" to observe private affairs and
violated the constitutional protection of the home.1
77
Under the same analysis, the use of non-intrusive technology to
screen vehicles at a ferry terminal will also be a search. The screening at
the ferry terminals will be from a lawful vantage point, but WSF will use
this technology to "see through" the locked compartments of the
vehicles. A vehicle does not have the same level of constitutional
protection as a home, but Washington courts have nonetheless
172. Rivera, supra note 145, at B1.
173. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text.
174. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986).
175. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text.
176. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 182-84, 867 P.2d 593, 598-99 (1994).
177. Id. at 183, 867 P.2d at 598.
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recognized a strong expectation of privacy in vehicles.1 78 Under article I,
section 7, the Supreme Court of Washington has frequently noted the
history of a legitimate, and constitutionally protected, expectation of
privacy in both vehicles and objects hidden inside. 79 This expectation of
privacy increases when the owner locks items within vehicle
compartments. 18 ° Applying the Young factors, the use of technology
from a lawful vantage point to "see into" the compartments of a
constitutionally protected vehicle, although less obtrusive than opening
and inspecting vehicle compartments, will still be a search under
article I, section 7.
3. The Use of Dogs To Screen Vehicles Will Also Constitute a Search
Under Article L Section 7
Applying the Young factors to dog sniffs, the use of dogs to detect
explosives or contraband in motor vehicles will also qualify as a search
under article I, section 7. Relying on dicta in Young that a dog sniff of an
area "subject to heightened constitutional protections" might constitute a
search under article I, section 7,181 Division I of the Washington State
Court of Appeals ruled in State v. Dearman182 that a dog sniff of a
garage was a search. 83 The Dearman court applied the Young factors
and determined that the dog sniff was from a lawful vantage point
outside the garage, but that the sniff allowed the officers to "see through
the walls" of the garage, and the garage was constitutionally protected
because of its proximity to a home. 84 The court concluded that this dog
sniff satisfied the Young factors and was therefore a search.185
Similarly, WSF's proposed use of dogs to screen motor vehicles will
constitute a search and trigger the protections of article I, section 7. Like
the dog sniff in the Dearman case, WSF's proposed dog sniff will be
from a lawful vantage point. However, these sniffs will allow WSF
178. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152, 720 P.2d at 441.
179. See City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456-58, 755 P.2d 775, 776-77 (1988);
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152-53, 720 P.2d at 441.
180. See Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152-53, 720 P.2d at 441.
181. Young, 123 Wash. 2d at 188, 867 P.2d at 600.
182. 92 Wash. App. 630, 962 P.2d 850 (1998), review denied, 137 Wash. 2d 1032, 980 P.2d 1286
(1999).




employees to see inside vehicles to "ensure that dangerous substances
and devices ... are not present.' 86 WSF's use of dogs will produce the
same kind of intrusion that existed in the Dearman case.
Finally, Washington courts have continuously recognized a legitimate
expectation of privacy in vehicles under article I, section 7.187 This
legitimate expectation distinguishes dog sniffs of vehicles from the
previous appellate court decisions holding that dog sniffs were not
searches where the owner had no expectation of privacy in the object or
location sniffed.' 88 Motor vehicles do not share the highest protections
afforded to homes. 189 However, the Young court only referred to
"heightened constitutional protection" in its discussion of when a dog
sniff would be a search,' 90 and vehicles should meet this standard. The
Supreme Court of Washington has consistently held that article I,
section 7 provides a higher level of constitutional protection for vehicles
than the Fourth Amendment. 191 The court has noted that these
protections increase when the driver locks a vehicle compartment. 92
Thus, the use of dogs to screen motor vehicles will satisfy the Young
factors and will constitute a search under article I, section 7.
B. Non-Intrusive Technology and Dog Searches Would Not Satisfy
Any Recognized Exception to the Warrant Requirements
Having established that the use of technological devices or dogs will
constitute searches under article I, section 7, these searches are per se
unreasonable unless they satisfy one of the recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement. 193 This Comment assumes that four of the six
exceptions-search incident to arrest, inventory searches, plain view,
and investigative stops-would be inapplicable to routine screenings at
ferry terminals. Because WSF is not arresting its passengers, or
impounding the passengers' vehicles, these screenings would not be
186. National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. §§ 101.105 (2003); seesupra Part III.A.
187. See, e.g., City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456-57, 755 P.2d 775, 776-77
(1988).
188. See supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
189. See State v. Johnson, 128 Wash. 2d 431, 449, 909 P.2d 293, 303 (1996).
190. State v. Young, 123 Wash. 2d 173, 188, 867 P.2d 593, 600 (1994).
191. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 69 n.l, 917 P.2d 563, 567 n.l (1996).
192. See State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986).
193. See Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d at 71, 917 P.2d at 568.
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searches incident to arrest 94 or inventory searches. 195 WSF intends to
screen for items inside closed vehicle containers-not just inadvertently
discover objects in plain view. 196 Finally, WSF will not have the
reasonable and particularized suspicion necessary to conduct an
investigative stop. 197 If neither of the two remaining exceptions-
consent and exigent circumstances-are satisfied, the proposed searches
will be unconstitutional under article I, section 7.198
1. Conditioning Ferry Passage on Consent to Non-Intrusive
Technology and Dog Screenings Will Not Satisfy the Consent
Exception to the Warrant Requirement
WSF will not be able to satisfy the consent exception by requiring
passengers to consent to searches as a condition of passage on the
ferry.199 The consent exception requires voluntarily,200 uncoerced 2°'
consent. Conditioning ferry travel on consent to search is analogous to
the rock concert searches struck down by the Supreme Court of
Washington in Jacobsen v. City of Seattle.2 °2 In Jacobsen, concert
patrons were required to submit to searches as a condition of their
admission to the concert.2 °3 The court rejected the notion that the rock
concert searches were consensual despite video evidence showing
194. A search incident to arrest must be conducted "[d]uring the arrest process, including the time
immediately subsequent to the suspect's being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car" and
is generally limited to searches for weapons or destructible evidence. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 152,
720 P.2d at 441.
195. The rationale for allowing inventory searches is to allow law-enforcement officers to
precisely catalog property to defend against claims of theft, vandalism, or negligence. See State v.
Dugas, 109 Wash. App. 592, 597, 36 P.3d 577, 580 (2001).
196. The plain view exception will justify a warrantless search where an officer: (1) has a prior
justification for the intrusion; (2) inadvertently discovers the incriminating evidence; and (3)
immediately recognizes the item as contraband. See State v. Myers, 117 Wash. 2d 332, 346, 815
P.2d 761, 769 (1991).
197. Investigative stops allow law-enforcement officers to briefly detain persons for questioning
if the law-enforcement officer reasonably suspects these persons of criminal activity. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
198. See supra Part I.C; notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
199. See National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. § 104.265(e)(2) (2003); supra Part
I.B.1.
200. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
202. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 670, 658 P.2d 653, 654-55 (1983).
203. See id. at 669-70, 658 P.2d at 654.
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patrons cheerfully complying with the search requirement. 204 In contrast
to the activity at issue in Jacobsen, use of the ferry system is a necessity
for 20,000 daily passengers, especially for residents of Vashon Island
and the San Juan Islands who commute by ferry between their homes
and work places. 20 5 As in Jacobsen, Washington courts are likely to find
any consent of ferry passengers invalid because continued use of the
ferry system is conditioned on giving this consent.
Additionally, WSF cannot rely on the "implied consent" doctrine to
uphold these proposed searches. This limited extension of the consent
requirement only applies to instances where there is clear evidence that
the search will find evidence of a specific crime.20 6 In State v. Curran,
the Supreme Court of Washington upheld a statute that implied a
driver's consent to a blood alcohol test, but only where there "was a
clear indication that it would reveal evidence of [the driver's]
intoxication. 20 7 WSF will not have a similar indication that the
screening of vehicles will uncover evidence of any crime. Instead, WSF
will be randomly selecting and screening a certain number of vehicles20 8
out of over 20,000 daily passengers.20 9 WSF will have no reason to
believe that passengers in every screened vehicle are involved in
criminal activity. Consequently, WSF will not be able to use the doctrine
of "implied consent" to justify the non-intrusive technology and dog
screening of vehicles at ferry terminals.
2. These Searches Will Not Satisfy the Exigent Circumstances
Exception Because There Is No Individualized Probable Cause To
Search Each Vehicle
Without individualized probable cause to search each vehicle, the
WSF's proposal to use non-intrusive technology or dogs will not satisfy
the exigent circumstances exception. Under this exception, the state
actor conducting the search must have probable cause to believe that
evidence of a crime, in this case terrorism, will be found in the vehicle
being searched. 210 To establish probable cause, there must be a nexus
204. Id. at 674, 658 P.2d at 656-57.
205. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 1, at 1-2.
206. See State v. Curran, 116 Wash. 2d 174, 179-84, 804 P.2d 558, 561-64 (1991).
207. Id. at 184, 804 P.2d at 564.
208. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 15, at 2.
209. WASH. STATE FERRIES, supra note 1, at 1-2.
210. See supra Part 1.C.2.
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between the vehicles searched and the crime of terrorism.2 ' The NMSI
regulations will require WSF to search randomly selected vehicles-or
all vehicles--depending on the threat level.212 Because these vehicles
will not be selected based on any particularized information, they will
not have the requisite nexus to terrorism. Without this nexus, no
probable cause will exist sufficient to justify these searches under the
exigent circumstances exception.
The Washington State Court of Appeals' decision in State v.
Silvernail upholding a search of all vehicles on a ferry 213 does not
undermine this conclusion. First, the court in Silvernail only considered
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, not article I,
section 7.2l4 Second, the Supreme Court of Washington limited the
Silvernail decision to "situations in which there was reliable information
that a felony had recently been committed, ' 215 such as when the fleeing
suspect was believed to be on a particular ferry. A similar situation will
not arise during the proposed screenings at ferry terminals. Even under
the highest level of threat, the U.S. Coast Guard recognizes that it may
not be able to identify a specific target.216 Therefore, during normal
operations, WSF will not have the kind of "reliable information" to
search vehicles on all of its ferries that the Silvernail court used to justify
searches on a particular ferry.
3. Despite the Threat to Public Safety Posed by Terrorists, These
Searches Will Not Be Permissible Under Article , Section 7
WSF cannot use the threat of terrorism as an exception to the warrant
requirement. Unlike Fourth Amendment decisions upholding searches at
airports217 and courthouses, 218 the Supreme Court of Washington does
not recognize an exception to the warrant requirement under article I,
section 7 for situations where a threat to public safety is sufficient to
justify warrantless searches. The court refers to only the six "jealously
211. See supra Part I.C.2.
212. National Maritime Security Initiative, 33 C.F.R. § 104.265(e)-(g) (2003).
213. State v. Silvernail, 25 Wash. App. 185, 190-91, 605 P.2d 1279, 1282-83 (1980).
214. Id. This opinion was decided six years before State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d
808 (1986), and before Washington courts began to routinely address state constitutional issues.
215. City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 458 n.1, 755 P.2d 775, 777 n.1 (1988).
216. See 33 C.F.R. § 101.105.
217. See United States v. Skipwith, 482 F.2d 1272, 1276 (5th Cir. 1973).
218. See Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1972).
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and carefully drawn" exceptions when deciding a case under article I,
section 7.219 In Mesiani, the court had.the opportunity to create a new
exception to allow sobriety checkpoints and curb drunk driving.
220
Although presented with evidence of "slaughter on our highways, 22' the
court refused to draw "an inference from statistics that there are
inebriated drivers in the area." 222 Before Gunwall, the court had
acknowledged, but never applied, the balancing test used to justify
searches at airports and courthouses where the danger to the public was
severe and the intrusion was minimal. 3 However, when confronted
with the danger posed by drunk driving, the court rejected the notion of a
balancing test exception under article I, section 7, whereby the public
safety benefit could outweigh individual privacy rights.224 Following this
precedent, the court is unlikely to "draw inferences" that there are
terrorists on a particular ferry and unlikely to allow an inferred threat to
public safety to outweigh real violations of privacy rights.
V. CONCLUSION
By June 30, 2004, WSF plans to begin screening vehicles through the
use of non-intrusive technology or dogs to avoid a possible shutdown for
failure to satisfy the NMSI security requirements. Although WSF is
attempting to find a constitutionally and publicly acceptable alternative
to physically opening and searching vehicles, ascertaining the contents
of vehicles-whether by physical search or dog sniff-is still a search
under article I, section 7. Because these searches do not fit any of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement, the searches are likely to be
unconstitutional.
A constitutional challenge to these screenings, although supported by
current article I, section 7 precedent concerning dog sniffs and vehicle
searches, will not necessarily be successful. When considering this
challenge, Washington courts will be influenced by the changed security
concerns following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the
disastrous possibility of a ferry system shutdown, neither of which were
219. See State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash. 2d 61, 72, 917 P.2d 563, 569 (1996).
220. See Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 458, 755 P.2d at 777.
221. Fury v. City of Seattle, 46 Wash. App. 110, 117, 730 P.2d 62, 66 (1986), rev'd sub nom
Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-58, 755 P.2d at 776-77.
222. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at458 n.l, 755 P.2d at 777 n.l.
223. See Jacobsen v. City of Seattle, 98 Wash. 2d 668, 673-74, 658 P.2d 653, 656 (1983).
224. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d at 456-57, 755 P.2d at 777.
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present in prior article I, section 7 cases. Ultimately, the courts may
modify article I, section 7 jurisprudence to add a new exception for
minimally intrusive searches where the threat from terrorists is severe.
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